

NSC BRIEFING **TOP SECRET** 11 September 1954

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RECENT SOVIET MOVES AGAINST GERMAN REARMAMENT

I. RECENT SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MOVES AND PROP-  
AGANDA STATEMENTS SHOW USSR PLACING HEAVY  
RELIANCE ON PUBLIC PRESSURE IN WESTERN EUROPE  
IN ORDER TO FORCE CHANGES, OR AT LEAST IN-  
DECISION AND INACTION, IN OFFICIAL POLICIES  
ON GERMAN REARMAMENT. THE METHOD IS TO DRIVE  
A WEDGE BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL FACTIONS OF  
EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTIES AND BETWEEN THE  
PUBLIC OPINIONS AND GOVERNMENTS.

II. THE 9 SEPTEMBER PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY  
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY ON EUROPEAN  
SECURITY AND GERMAN REARMAMENT IS MOST RECENT  
EXAMPLE THIS APPROACH.

A. IT WAS INTENDED AS A CLEAR RESTATEMENT  
OF SOVIET OPPOSITION TO ANY FORM OF WEST  
GERMAN REARMAMENT.

B. PROVIDES CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THE TACTIC  
OF OFFERING AMMUNITION TO FRENCH AND OTHER  
EUROPEAN OPPONENTS OF GERMAN REARMAMENT.

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C. IT CONTAINED NO NEW SUBSTANTIVE LINES OR INDICATIONS OF A CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

D. ITS WORDING MAKES CLEAR USSR INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO RELY ON THE FRENCH AS THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF BLOCKING WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT.

E. IT SUGGESTS THAT USSR DOES NOT CONSIDER A MAJOR CONCESSION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME TO HEAD OFF GERMAN REARMAMENT. STATEMENT SIMPLY REITERATES SUPPORT FOR A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE ON GERMANY, MOLOTOV'S PROPOSAL FOR EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND A SETTLEMENT OF ARMAMENTS PROBLEM

III. FRANCE: MOSCOW'S APPROACH AIMS TO CULTIVATE SUPPORT OF MENDES-FRANCE GOVERNMENT FOR SOVIET PLANS FOR GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY.

A. METHOD IS TO OFFER SUFFICIENT BAIT SO THAT FRENCH WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE THEIR

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SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE TO WEST GERMAN  
REARMAMENT, MAINLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS  
WITH THE USSR.

1. NOW SEEMS CLEAR THAT PREDOMINANT  
FACTOR IN DECISION TO CONCLUDE  
INDOCHINA ARMISTICE ON TERMS MORE  
FAVORABLE THAN FRENCH MIGHT HOPE WAS  
MOSCOW'S EXPECTATION THAT FRANCE WOULD  
SERVE AS THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF ITS  
CAMPAIGN AGAINST GERMAN REARMAMENT.
- B. MOSCOW'S OVERTURES TO FRANCE IN RECENT  
WEEKS HAVE INCLUDED:

1. POLISH OFFER OF A TREATY OF  
FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TO  
FRANCE ON 25 AUGUST, JUST PRIOR TO  
START OF ASSEMBLY'S FINAL DEBATE ON  
EDC.
2. STATEMENT BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR  
VINOGRADOV ON FOLLOWING DAY, 26  
AUGUST, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SAW LARGE  
MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOVIET

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AND FRENCH POSITIONS ON DISARMAMENT.

THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT THOSE  
FRENCH ELEMENTS WHO SEE THE PROSPECT  
OF A DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT AS THE BEST  
EXCUSE FOR POSTPONING GERMAN REARMAMENT  
AND CUTTING FRENCH MILITARY EXPENDI-  
TURES.

3. MOSCOW MAY NOW SEEK NEW WAYS TO  
ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH TO BELIEVE THAT  
FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT  
WOULD BE FRUITFUL.

IV. BRITAIN: RECENT SOVIET MOVES HAVE BEEN  
DIRECTED TOWARD STRENGTHENING OPPOSITION TO  
THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON GERMAN REARMAMENT.  
MOSCOW APPARENTLY REGARDS LABOR OPINION AS  
THE MOST PROMISING FIELD FOR EXPLOITATION.

A. PRAYDA'S BLAST AT MR. ATTLEE ON 9  
SEPTEMBER REPRESENTS ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE  
THE POSITION OF THE LABOR PARTY ON GERMAN  
REARMAMENT AT THE FORTHCOMING LABOR PARTY

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CONFERENCE. IT WAS ALSO AIMED AT DIS-  
CREDITING ATTLEE'S LEADERSHIP AND  
STRENGTHENING THE BEVAN FACTION.

1. STRONG CRITICISM OF ATTLEE IN  
STRIKING CONTRAST WITH ITS FAVORABLE  
REFERENCE TO BEVAN'S VIEWS ON GERMAN  
AND JAPANESE REARMAMENT. PRAVDA  
SOUGHT TO SHOW THAT ATTLEE FORCED  
TO UNDERTAKE VISIT TO USSR AND CHINA  
BY INSISTENCE OF PARTY RANK-AND-FILE.
2. ARTICLE ATTEMPTED TO UNDERMINE  
ATTLEE'S POSITION IN EYES OF RANK-  
AND-FILE BY IDENTIFYING HIS VIEWS ON  
GERMAN REARMAMENT WITH "REACTIONARY  
ELEMENTS IN US AND BRITAIN."
3. FURTHER INDICATION OF SOVIET  
ATTITUDE TOWARD ATTLEE REVEALED AT  
DINNER GIVEN BY MALENKOV FOR LABOR  
DELEGATION 10 AUGUST. KHRUSHCHEV'S

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TOAST WAS ADDRESSED DIRECTLY TO BEVAN.  
ATTLEE WAS ALMOST COMPLETELY IGNORED  
ON BOTH THIS AND THE SUCCEEDING EVEN-  
ING'S FESTIVITIES.

B. SOVIET EFFORT TO INFLUENCE LABOR POLICY  
ALSO EVIDENCE SHVERNIK'S 7 SEPTEMBER  
INVITATION TO CONGRESS OF BRITISH TRADE  
UNION COUNCIL TO SEND DELEGATION TO USSR  
AND TO RESUME THE ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE UNION  
COMMITTEE.

1. SOVIET PRESS DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE  
INTEREST IN TRADE UNION CONGRESS,  
STATING THAT VOTE FAVORING REARMING  
WEST GERMANY PASSED BY SUCH NARROW  
MARGIN THAT "IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT  
SUCH A RESOLUTION MAY WELL BE  
DEFEATED" AT COMING LABOR PARTY  
CONFERENCE.


C. SOVIET INTEREST IN MANIPULATING LABOR  
OPINION ALSO REFLECTED IN NOTICE GIVEN

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TO BEVAN'S PAMPHLET, "IT MUST NOT HAPPEN."  
IN 26 AUGUST INTERVIEW WITH MENDES-FRANCE,  
SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV STATED THAT  
SOVIET GOVERNMENT SAW NUMBER OF WORTHWHILE  
SUGGESTIONS IN THIS BOOK.

V. GERMANY: MOSCOW HAS NOT NEGLECTED TO  
REMINDE THE WEST GERMANS OF THEIR STAKE IN  
REARMAMENT ISSUE.

A. AT BERLIN CONFERENCE MOLOTOV HAMMERED  
REPEATEDLY THAT:

1. RATIFICATION OF EDC WOULD PER-  
MANENTLY SEAL PARTITION OF GERMANY
2. EDC, BY STATIONING AMERICAN,  
BRITISH, AND FRENCH TROOPS THERE,  
WOULD CONVERT WEST GERMANY INTO A  
"SEMIOCCUPIED" COUNTRY.
3. THAT BONN AND PARIS AGREEMENTS  
HUMILIATING TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE.
4. THAT ONLY HOPE OF UNIFICATION  
RESTED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EAST

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GERMAN REGIME AND REPUDIATION ON  
ADENAUER'S WESTERN-ORIENTED POLICIES.

B. FOLLOWING BERLIN CONFERENCE, MOLOTOV  
MOVED QUICKLY TO ENHANCE PRESTIGE AND  
OSTENSIBLE FREEDOM OF GDR GOVERNMENT.

1. USSR GRANTED "SOVEREIGNTY" TO THIS  
REGIME ON 26 MARCH.

2. GDR GIVEN INITIATIVE IN TRADE  
OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WEST, AND  
ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH OFFICIAL TRADE  
DELEGATIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AS  
FIRST STEP TOWARD INTERNATIONAL  
RECOGNITION.

3. USSR ABOLISHED ALL SOVIET  
OCCUPATION LEGISLATION ON POLITICAL,  
ECONOMIC, CULTURAL MATTERS IN EAST  
GERMANY ON 6 AUGUST. THIS MOST  
DRAMATIC SOVIET STEP TO ENHANCE  
PRESTIGE AND OSTENSIBLE FREEDOM GDR  
GOVERNMENT SINCE GRANT OF SOVEREIGNTY.

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4. RECENT RELAXATION OF CONTROLS ON EAST GERMAN TRAVEL TO WEST GERMANY COINCIDES WITH POLICY OF ENCOURAGING CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY IN HOPE THAT WEST GERMAN PUBLIC WILL SUPPORT AN ALL-GERMAN CONFERENCE ON UNIFICATION AND OTHER PROBLEMS.

C. MOSCOW MAY BE EXPECTED TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF A REPORTED PLAN OF THE WEST GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS TO CREATE PUBLIC ATTITUDE FAVORING NEGOTIATIONS WITH GDR REGIME AND THE NEUTRALIZATION OF GERMANY.

D. SOVIET POLICY OF GRANTING CONCESSIONS TO GDR MOTIVATED BY INTENTION PROMOTE EAST GERMANY AS A PARTNER IN INTERNATIONAL AND ALL-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS, TO STIMULATE FRENCH-WEST GERMAN DIFFERENCES.

E. EXTENSION OF CONCESSIONS AND SUCH STATEMENTS AS MALENKOV'S TO GROTEWOHL

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THAT USSR IS INTERESTED IN EXPANDING TIES  
WITH WEST GERMANY ALL REFLECT BASIC AIM  
OF DISCREDITING PRO-WESTERN POLICY OF  
BONN GOVERNMENT AND ENCOURAGING EVERY  
TENDENCY IN WEST GERMANY TO CHALLENGE  
ADENAUER.

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